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The speed and uncertainty of environmental change in the Anthropocene challenge the capacity of
coevolving social–ecological–technological systems (SETs) to adapt or transform to these changes. Formal
government and legal structures further constrain the adaptive capacity of our SETs. However, new, self-
organized forms of adaptive governance are emerging at multiple scales in natural resource-based SETs.
Adaptive governance involves the private and public sectors as well as formal and informal institutions,
self-organized to fill governance gaps in the traditional roles of states. While new governance forms are
emerging, they are not yet doing so rapidly enough to match the pace of environmental change. Further-
more, they do not yet possess the legitimacy or capacity needed to address disparities between the
winners and losers from change. These emergent forms of adaptive governance appear to be particularly
effective in managing complexity. We explore governance and SETs as coevolving complex systems, fo-
cusing on legal systems to understand the potential pathways and obstacles to equitable adaptation. We
explore how governments may facilitate the emergence of adaptive governance and promote legitimacy
in both the process of governance despite the involvement of nonstate actors, and its adherence to dem-
ocratic values of equity and justice. To manage the contextual nature of the results of change in complex
systems, we propose the establishment of long-term study initiatives for the coproduction of knowledge, to
accelerate learning and synergize interactions between science and governance and to foster public science
and epistemic communities dedicated to navigating transitions to more just, sustainable, and resilient
futures.
governance | complex systems | social–ecological–technological systems | law and science
The Great Acceleration as a Science and
Governance Challenge
Global environmental change reflected in the “Anthro-
pocene” epoch coincides with unprecedented rates of
change in social and technological systems brought
about by climate change, biodiversity loss, globalization,
the digital revolution, development, and population
growth (1). Increasing interdependence within social,
ecological, and technological systems (SETs) presents
obstacles to both adaptation and transformation as the
results of change unfold. In particular, it introduces a
high level of uncertainty into how these systems will
respond. Rising to this challenge requires a new focus
for government and new approaches at the interface
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between science and governance. To understand this, it is useful to
begin with an example of the types of problems that led modern
environmental and natural resources law to a predominant mix
of regulatory and market-based approaches, with regulation
implemented by science-based agencies in which a layer of
political bureaucracy generally stands between the scientist and
the decision maker.
Garrett Hardin’s (2) 1968 example of the inevitable tragedy of
degradation of a common pool resource (e.g., public grazing land,
air, water) where benefits of use are individual and harm is spread
across all users, led him to suggest that either regulation or private
ownership were necessary to align the interests of resource users
with the public good. Hardin’s underlying focus was on population
growth, but as with many who cite his article, it is the attention he
called to the logical consequences of increasing per capita resource
exploitation on environmental health that is of relevance here. In a
time of slow change in human interaction with the environment, the
simplicity of Hardin’s commons made plausible a binary choice
between science-based regulation and private property markets.
Furthermore, in a simplistic view of the commons, science and
governance could be understood as independent. Elected and
appointed officials set goals. Scientists and engineers designed the
means to optimize for those goals (3, 4).
Imagine Hardin’s pasture today with the recognition of a much
more interdependent system of nature, infrastructure, and society
facing accelerating change (Fig. 1):
Development encroaches on the floodplain, moving grazing
into the uplands where it depends on irrigation. Technology led to
the development of dams for irrigation, flood control, and carbon-
free hydropower for the area, but those same dams block salmon
migration and reduce sediment flow. Salmon are critical to regional
indigenous culture. Aging water infrastructure in poor neighborhoods
presents water quality threats to health. Coal mining in the head-
waters has resulted in destruction of habitat and downstream heavy
metal contamination, but is the sole job source for much of the rural
area. Alternatives for a viable rural economy do not currently exist.
Agricultural intensification and encroachment on wildlands lead to
transmission of disease from wild to domestic animals, raising
concerns over the possibility of zoonosis. External factors include
changing global markets for agricultural products and coal, pan-
demic, and climate change. The latter is driving lower snowpack in
the headwaters of the river, longer periods of drought, higher de-
cadal floods, and species migration into new geographic regions.
The wildland–urban interface has potential for catastrophic wildfire.
Efforts to move toward carbon neutrality will increase the value of
the hydropower system and threaten rural livelihoods dependent
on coal.
Aspects of this generalized example play out in many SETs
throughout the world. There is broad consensus that due to the
accelerating rate of change and uncertainty in its trajectory and
outcome, we cannot design our way to top-down, transferrable,
science-based solutions in complex SETs commons (3–5).
The scholarly community led by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom
has shown that in complex settings Hardin’s tragedies are being
avoided as mixtures of public and private actors self-organize to
solve social–ecological problems. This empirical work documents
that self-organization leading to emergent “adaptive governance”
allows the consideration of values, local knowledge, and different
world views. Adaptive governance provides an avenue for tailoring
responses to the emergent properties of complex systems and is
widely viewed as capable of handling complexity, uncertainty, and
change (5–7).
“Governance” in this context involves any form of collective
action taken to manage the common affairs of society and occurs
as intentional and self-organized interactions among governments,
private groups, and formal and informal institutions (6, 8, 9). The use
of the term has increased as private actors, public–private part-
nerships, and collaborative processes play an increasing role in
collective action, addressing a wide range of social challenges (8,
10–12). Within this larger crucible, governance produced through
self-organization of nonstate actors is increasing in response to
the real and perceived failures of government (6, 8, 10), the global
reach of economic actors and other nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) (12), and to increasing complexity (8, 10, 11). We
Fig. 1. This stylized drawing of a modern watershed illustrates the dynamics of a complex commons and the need for a multipronged governance
response. Discrete pollution discharges, such as those from the factory and sewage treatment plant, are sometimes appropriate targets for
simple regulation. However, given the multiple, distributed human actions with cumulative or synergistic impacts; the complex interactions
between human activity and environmental change; the competing interests of watershed users; cross-jurisdictional effects; and external drivers
of change, the limited focus of regulatory regimes regulation alone is often not sufficient to manage all interconnected problems afflicting heavily
used modern commons. Illustration credit: Megan Caye Ashe (Washington State University, Pullman, WA).
2 of 9 | PNAS Cosens et al.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2102798118 Governing complexity: Integrating science, governance, and law to manage
































focus further on the governance of “SETs,” defined as interacting
natural and human systems in which the technological component
represents the increasingly complex realm of interaction between
the human and natural systems (13), reflecting the type of sub-
systems members of our team focus on. The technological com-
ponent includes the infrastructure and products that humans develop
from and in the natural environment (14), and the “methods, pro-
cesses, materials, machines, tools and techniques” used for that
development (13).
Our own work and that of others have documented the emer-
gence of self-organized adaptive governance in complex SETs
settings across the globe [e.g., North America and Australia (11, 15,
16), Europe (17–19), and Africa (20)]. Unfortunately, change through
emergent governance is not keeping pace with the rate of envi-
ronmental and social change, frequently runs into legal barriers,
and does not always focus on the public good. Of critical impor-
tance, prevailing approaches to funded research produce a snap-
shot in time that is inadequate to inform governance in rapidly
evolving SETs. It is therefore useful to explore 1) whether theories
such as complexity and ecological resilience theory that help us
understand change in ecological systems might also inform how
government can speed up and steer emergent adaptive gover-
nance systems; 2) whether government might also have a role in
steering emergent adaptive governance toward the public good
and in providing restraints and checks on processes that lack at-
tention to legitimacy (defined in this context to include transpar-
ency, accountability, and access to decision making, as well as
democratic processes of deliberation and voting), equity, and jus-
tice; 3) whether a focus on steering adaptive governance toward
effective evolution changes the role of science in informing gov-
ernance of SETs including presenting a need for the adaptation of
efforts to gather, synthesize, interpret, and communicate scientific
information through time; and finally, 4) whether the science needed
to inform the governance of changing complex SETs requires a dif-
ferent type of scientist trained within a governance setting.
In a decade-long project that brought together ecologists, hu-
man geographers, and experts in institutional analysis, with legal
scholars, we found that complexity science, despite its limitations in
application to society, provided a bridging theory and common
language that fostered communication across disciplines. This
common frame allowed us to explore means for government to
accelerate new approaches to governance of SETs (11, 21). Com-
plexity science, with its roots in mathematics, and resilience with its
roots in ecology, do not fully account for social attributes such as
agency, power, and empathy. Social scientists are beginning to
embrace complexity and to grapple with these unique human at-
tributes in that context (22, 23). However, the integration of these
diverse approaches with complexity is only beginning to emerge at
the level needed to inform governance of SETs. Importantly, the
application of complexity science to governance cannot address
questions of governance equity—i.e., governance for whom? The
involvement of nonstate actors means that emergent governance
may, at best, only address problems for certain segments of society,
and at worst, may choose goals that are detrimental to society. We
address this gap by integrating the work of political scientists and
legal scholars—disciplines that acknowledge the role of agency,
power, and empathy including the potential negative impact a self-
organized societal response to change can have on legitimacy,
equity, and justice.We then ask what a broader role for government
in facilitating emergent adaptive governance means for scientific
research and education at the science–policy interface. We con-
clude that response to modern rapid drivers of change (such as
climate change) requires research that allows for deep analysis of
complex SETs through time and understanding of governance, law,
and science as integrated knowledge systems. This in turn requires
education of a new type of “public” scientist. This article presents
the culmination of that project.
Interdisciplinary Methods for Bridging Science and
Governance
Boundary spanning research must begin by identifying common
ground and developing a common language (24). We begin by
exploring what governance scholars can learn from complexity
science about emergent behavior, including adaptation and non-
linear change in SETs, and thus, how the language of complexity
science might provide a bridge between those who study SETs and
those who study governance. Through a focus on system resilience,
complexity science has changed the way science understands
systems as varied as ecological systems (22, 23) and the growth and
development of cities (25). While many agree that social systems,
including legal and governance systems, are complex adaptive
systems (26, 27), the application of complexity theory to social
systems is contested due to the theory’s failure to account for hu-
man attributes related to consciousness and free will (28). It is well
understood that governance is strongly influenced by these at-
tributes, particularly human agency, power, and empathy (9, 29).
While we recognize these limitations of complexity science, we
nevertheless find the concepts of system complexity and resil-
ience useful in understanding the coevolution of legal and gov-
ernance systems with other systems embedded in complex SETs.
Our focus is not on whether complexity theory can describe or
predict patterns in social behavior, but on whether it can inform
efforts to adjust legal systems to accelerate governance responses
to system change.
Six attributes of complex systems are relevant to this exercise
of informing governance:
1) Self-organization. The interaction of components of complex
systems leads to relatively stable states independent of any
intentional design (4, 30–32). For example, markets composed
of numerous individual decisions self-organize due to interac-
tion of supply and demand and lead to stability in economic
systems over multiple geographic scales (33, 34). As docu-
mented by Ostrom and her laboratory (6, 7, 10, 35), social
systems also self-organize both within formal systems of gov-
ernment and in their absence to sustain the resource systems
on which they rely.
2) Emergence. Emergence is a key attribute of complex systems
and applies to the novel properties resulting from self-organization
that would not be predicted from study of system components
alone (32). An important facet of the use of complexity science
to inform governance is that emergence is contextual, dependent
on system history and surroundings. As a result, understanding
regarding the capacity of a particular system for adaptation or
transformation may not be transferrable, even among seemingly
similar systems (31, 34). In governance systems observed to self-
organize in response to a problem, the possibility of innovation
exists (36). A challenge for government in managing systems un-
dergoing change is to support the innovation and adaptation
associated with bottom-up emergence of governance while
maintaining overall social and economic stability (21, 33, 37).
3) Networks. Networks in governance systems allow response at
the scale of a problem despite lack of “fit” with formal institu-
tions (21, 38, 39). They also mediate public–private interaction.
Cosens et al. PNAS | 3 of 9
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The capacity for government to work across jurisdictional and
sectoral boundaries is critical in times of rapid change due to
the inability to predict the scale and scope of problems that
will emerge (21).
4) Feedbacks. Feedback within a system can accelerate change
but can also be useful in learning. Negative feedbacks buffer
system changes and lead to system stability. Positive feed-
backs accelerate change andmay destabilize systems. In social
systems, positive feedback may be a factor in the current
increasing wealth gap in many western democracies, with
accumulation of wealth leading to greater agency and power
among the wealthy, thus increasing wealth, and poverty lead-
ing to decreasing agency and power and thus deeper poverty
(9). The concept of feedbacks also informs the monitoring
and adjustment steps of adaptive management and, thus, is
essential to learning (4).
5) Nonlinearity and tipping points. Complex systems faced with
disturbance, such as climate change, may shift into another
system state and that shift may be difficult to reverse (4, 30,
32, 40, 41). Governance focused on optimization of engi-
neered infrastructure rather than managing resilience may lack
the space to adapt, pushing systems closer to tipping points
(40, 42, 43). Government resources and leadership are needed
to move SETs farther from a tipping point or to facilitate equi-
table transformation (40, 42).
6) Uncertainty. Uncertainty is a product of the other five attributes
of complex systems and becomes increasingly problematic for
governance when a system is undergoing change (30, 44).
Complex systems are inherently unpredictable, and as a result
governance must recognize not only different types of uncer-
tainty but also develop new institutions to manage, navigate,
and resolve such unknowns.
Applying complexity science to the study of SETs emphasizes
that top-down design of government programs is not adequate to
manage the emergence, uncertainty, and nonlinearity of complex
systems undergoing change. With self-organized adaptive gover-
nance already emerging in response to that inadequacy, the new
focus of government must be to facilitate and steer the emergent
response.
This new focus requires a new perspective on the role of gov-
ernment in society. Social systems, including market as well as
regulated activities in economic systems thrive in a stable environ-
ment; legal systems are designed to support that stability (33).
However, both the attributes and empirical studies of SETs from
multiple disciplinary perspectives describe patterns of stability and
increasing complexity (8, 9), followed by instabilities (including
collapse and transformation) in response to both ecological and
technological change (8, 43). What is different today that requires
specific attention to the attributes of complexity is the pace of
change, the degree of social, ecological, and technological inter-
connection, and the coevolutionary dynamics of interdependent
systems when prescribing policy solutions (26). Governance must
help society navigate and steer society through such rapid evolu-
tionary transitions. Law and government are integral to that process.
Viewing Governance through the Lens of Complexity
To assist a society undergoing accelerating change, legal systems
must account for emergent responses to the attributes of complex
systems. No single entity, public or private, can orchestrate the
response to the surprising, multiscale nature of complex emerg-
ing problems in SETs. Self-organizing adaptive governance efforts
emerge at multiple scales, providing the functional and response
diversity referred to as polycentricity (7) and increasing the likeli-
hood of innovation through diverse experimentation at multiple
scales.
Scholarship on emerging forms of governance in response to
complexity in SETs has focused on the complexity attributes, their
relation to system complexity, and concerns with potential impacts
on social equity (21). Empirical observation and theoretical devel-
opment of the concept of “adaptive governance” comes from the
literature on governance of social–ecological systems (SES), with
theoretical foundations in resilience and sustainability (9, 13, 36,
39). Coincident with this work on SES governance, political scien-
tists who study globalized economic systems and view relationships
in these systems through the lens of power have observed and
theorized the development of “new governance.” The emergence
of similar governance patterns in different social sectors across
multiple levels of governance and convergence in the under-
standing of their structure and function from different disciplines
suggests that broader phenomena are at play, including response
to system complexity.
Adaptive governance is described in the context of human in-
teraction with the environment. In western democracies, this is an
area in which law and government have focused on a regulatory
approach since the 1960s. Adaptive governance is thought to
emerge in response to the unintended consequences of one-size-fits-
all regulation, competing sectoral goals, scarcity, and increasing in-
terdependence of system components (11, 36, 39). New governance
is described in the context of public services and the economy. It
refers to the increasing role of nonstate actors in the delivery of public
services and the self-organization of nonstate actors in response to
frustration with the unintended consequences of the neoliberal re-
forms of the 1980s and 1990s, including deregulation and over-
reliance on markets (8, 45).
New governance and adaptive governance both include as
essential features bottom-up self-organization and collaboration;
public, private, and public–private networks; and multiple nested
centers of authority (i.e., polycentricity) (6, 8, 10, 11, 36, 39, 45, 46).
Adaptive governance literature calls out the presence of processes
to manage uncertainty and mechanisms for learning and incre-
mental adaptation (4, 10, 11, 36, 37, 39, 47). Both emergent forms
of governance respond to increased connectivity and complexity
and the corresponding need for contextualization and adaptation.
They appear able to navigate and maintain overall social stability
when system trajectory is uncertain and fraught with surprise
(8, 10, 11, 36, 39). In short, they represent societal responses to
complexity.
Governing Complexity
While current theoretical and empirical work suggest that emer-
gent forms of governance may be promising in addressing
complexity (9, 11), emergence is ad hoc and is not occurring fast
enough to adapt or transform at the rate of change that char-
acterizes the Anthropocene. Any attempt to accelerate response
through intentional action must take into account the list of at-
tributes of complex systems. This requires governance that allows
for adaptation and transformation without destabilizing society as
a whole (recognizing that localized destabilization may be a pre-
requisite to transformation) (21, 33). Society can employ legal
systems to facilitate and operationalize innovations in governance,
including adaptive (10, 36, 39) and transformative (42) gover-
nance of SETs undergoing change and to steer them toward the
public good.
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It is also increasingly recognized that the ad hoc formation and
the individual motives of private actors may lead to increasing
inequity in access to decision-making and inequality in the results
of adaptive governance (8, 9), raising the question of how gov-
ernance itself is governed. To address this issue, we analyze the
role of government in steering emergent processes toward the
public good, and turn to the legal processes that manage legiti-
macy (including transparency and accountability) (48), access to
decision making (also referred to as “participatory capacity”) (21,
37), responsiveness (49), equity, and justice (38).
Government as Facilitator. Collaborative processes, when ac-
countable to clear government-established goals, can lead to in-
novative solutions that resolve tradeoffs among stakeholders and
link local and indigenous knowledge to the biophysical system,
allowing tailoring to the emergent results of complexity (50, 51). This
incorporation of other ways of knowing has been observed despite
emergence within western systems of science and government (52).
Without government facilitation, an emergent collaborative might
never have the resources (i.e., financing, knowledge, workforce,
and social capital) to develop and test new ideas. Without gov-
ernment steering, emergent governance will not necessarily act in
the public good [e.g., Al Qaeda is considered a “dark network” of
emergent governance (53)]. Without the scientific input (discussed
in the next section), the collaborative may never develop a process
of learning that allows it to adapt as the system changes.
In a complex SETs commons (Fig. 1), regulatory mechanisms
can be helpful but are often insufficient. In fact, conflicting regu-
lation may catalyze self-organization (11) and may be designed to
support experimentation (54). To facilitate adaptive governance,
centralized governments may also need to set societal goals,
while using incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks, public pro-
curement, and research funding, to support experimentation (54)
to steer nonstate governance actors toward those goals. Such an
approach may catalyze the bottom-up emergence of public or
private governance systems, as well as build capacity to address
problems at a more localized level. Government-as-facilitator may
cultivate cross-sectoral integration (e.g., between food, energy,
and water sectors) as well as coordinate cross-jurisdictional (e.g.,
among multiple local governments, or regional government and
tribes) and public–private networks (e.g., among state actors and
corporations that cross international boundaries) that are needed
to address complex problems (46).
The role of facilitator must be tiered with increasingly struc-
tured and higher-level leadership as the rate, risk, and scale of
the new problems intensify. Thus, a pandemic or sea level rise may
require leadership and clear policies from federal level as well as
resources to build local capacity, whereas increasing water tem-
peratures due to climate change may require local input to goal
setting and a tailored response tomitigate impacts on temperature-
dependent aquatic species.
For resilient solutions during periods of accelerating change,
government must provide continuity to smooth transition as pri-
vate sector interests innovate. During stable periods, incremental
policy changes will continue at a slower pace (55). Viewing gov-
ernance of complex systems as a complex system itself under-
scores the need for adjustment and mechanisms to evolve based
on feedback on policy efficacy and changing social values. In legal
terms, this requires judicial review to move from the initial stages
of planning to the evolving stages of implementation, and that the
basis for review be measured by progress toward goals rather
than predicted outcome (45).
The integration of new governance literature also helps address
the weakness in the adaptive governance literature—namely, the
failure to address agency, power, and empathy (9, 28, 29). Litera-
ture on new governance expresses concerns with the weakening
role of the state and the corresponding increasing role for private
actors in public governance, a formula that may result in lack of
attention to the attributes of legitimacy, equity, and justice, that is
only recently seeing uptake in the adaptive governance literature
(8, 9, 55). Those expressing concern look to an increase in the role
of government primarily through legal systems (8, 37, 43, 55).
Government as Manager of Legitimacy, Equity, and Justice.
Value-based attributes of western democracies—including legit-
imacy [defined in law to include processes that manage trans-
parency, accountability, access to decision making, as well as the
democratic processes of deliberation and voting (48)], equity, and
justice—can be undermined by ad hoc, private processes influ-
encing allocation of common pool resources, provision of public
services, globalized economies, and protection of public health
(8, 21). Where government is absent or ineffective, interests may
be left out, delay tactics by those benefiting from the status quo
may postpone solutions, local processes may be captured by
powerful interests, and highly innovative solutions stifled. Legiti-
macy is threatened when only powerful interests have the re-
sources to participate. Equity is threatened when there are no
checks on who bears the burden of change, and who receives
resources for adaptation and transformation. Justice is threatened
when there is no means to address corruption and provide review
for failure to meet the goals.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand the limits
of law in providing for legitimacy, equity, and justice. It goes too
far to suggest that government can be the “ensurer” of legiti-
macy, equity, and justice, but it is insufficient to say that it can be
only a “promoter.” We use the word “manager” to suggest an
active role, but one that lacks total control on outcomes. The re-
ality of democratic systems of governance is that the best such
systems can do is to establish and maintain the governmental
(i.e., legislative, executive, and judicial) processes to provide le-
gitimacy, equity, and justice. The role of law in this effort is to set
the stage for the best possible outcome from emerging adaptive
governance and keep it in place while adaptation and transforma-
tion unfold. To be sure, such rules are only as good as the ethics of
those in power, but the fact that agency and power may act as the
“trickster” and upset all the best-laid plans for legitimacy, equity,
and justice is no reason to avoid setting the stage with the most
carefully crafted rules possible. As Sir Winston Churchill (56) is said
to have stated, “it has been said that democracy is the worst form of
Government, except for all those other forms.”
With even the current adaptive mechanisms of democratic
governments, society has the capacity to incrementally address its
failures in legitimacy, equity, and justice. Thus, for example in the
coming years in the United States, society may consider changes
to campaign spending that prevent one person/one vote from
distortion by wealth; erect barriers to nepotism; revisit ethics rules
for those in office; reform policing and mental health intervention,
increase public education on civic responsibility, set up a bipar-
tisan commission to present a short list of highly qualified people
for appointment to federal courts, develop a newmeasure of GDP
that reflects wealth distribution, establish clear national lines on
pandemic response and develop redundancy within the tools and
technology needed for that response; and reinvest in education
and economic development in rural andmarginalized communities.
Cosens et al. PNAS | 5 of 9
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Then democracy will fail again, but in a different way. As Martin
Luther King Jr. stated, “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it
bends toward justice” (57). The best we can do is to offer laws that,
when used responsibly, will further that trajectory.
The tools available to increase the likelihood of legitimacy,
equity, and justice lie within the processes and curbs on corruption
established by the legal system. With these tools, ethical leaders
exercising agency, power, and empathy have a greater chance of
achieving legitimacy, equity, and justice, and the people—the
ultimate source of democracy—have a better chance of recog-
nizing corruption when it occurs. The ability of society to effect
these changes, or not, is thus, both the strength and weakness of
democracy. To attempt to “ensure” that will occur is to subvert
the very democracy we seek to inform.
In democratic governments, legitimacy, equity, and justice are
promoted through the structural allocation of authority in consti-
tutional law that provides for checks and balances (46), and the
careful procedural design found in the regime of administrative
law that dictates the process of government. Administrative law
includes requirements for open records, open meetings, public
comment, and judicial review (48). Administrative law governing
process, however, does not generally apply to nongovernmental
processes. With the addition of the unevenly distributed agency
and power of nonstate actors in emerging governance, govern-
ment must develop safeguards with 1) mechanisms that influence
private action; and 2) means to promote equity in access to de-
cision making and equitable distribution of its benefits (9, 21, 55).
Government may use incentives to influence private actions.
Thus, for example, it may promote transparency through require-
ments placed as conditions on the contribution of public funds in
contracts for private delivery of public services. Government may,
through regulatory law, control funding, establish monitoring and
reporting requirements for private actors in governance, and pro-
vide access to court when actors fail to report or provide equal
access to participation. By requiring public access to reporting,
government may hold private actors accountable when they for-
mulate governance solutions. To safeguard the public good, it re-
mains the role of government to set goals. However, in the face of
uncertainty, government cannot simply provide upfront review
and approval of a plan designed to achieve certain government
established goals. Instead, accountability must be measured by
monitoring progress toward goals as innovative solutions with
uncertain outcomes are attempted. In the face of irreducible un-
certainty, comprehensive planning will not provide the needed
information, and may lock in decisions that turn out to be less than
optimal or based on mistaken assumptions. Instead, account-
ability must be provided by transparently monitoring progress
(44). Finally, government must play a leadership role in mediating
competing private interests to promote legitimate settlement of
disputes and equitable outcomes.
These measures, however, do little to address the problem
increasingly recognized as a secondary impact of the growth in
private governance—inequity in access to decision making, and
inequality in the distribution of benefits (9, 36, 55). Tax laws have
been the traditional source of redistribution of wealth in democratic
societies. But we agree with Clark and Harley (9) that a bottom-up
process of capacity building in marginalized and impoverished
communities is needed to address not only wealth inequality, but
inequality in education, knowledge, access to decision makers, and
time to participate. Cosens et al. (37) characterized this as the role of
law and government in building “participatory capacity.”
New Institutions for Governing Complexity
Learning in a way that can cope with the need for dynamic gov-
ernance requires both changes in education and a new focus in
the science of SETs. While the need for interdisciplinary research
has long been considered important to inform complex gover-
nance decisions, gaps exist in addressing the complex interaction
between governance and SETs as coevolving systems. As noted
by Fazey et al. (ref. 58, p. 5, emphasis added), we “need to go
beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating
wisdom about how to act within it.” In addition, within rapidly
changing systems the quest for knowledge transferability in
space must be supplemented by transferability through time to
place system evolution within its complex historic context, thereby
creating a deeper understanding of its trajectory. To fill these gaps,
we suggest 1) the establishment of long-term, integrated, and
transdisciplinary study programs to address the complexity of the
coevolution of governance and SETs over time (long-term social–
ecological–technological study areas [LT-SETs]); and 2) training
within LT-SETs for new types of professionals with knowledge of
governance, law, and science of SETs who can help navigate un-
certain futures by developing wisdom and understanding. In ad-
vancing these ideas, we acknowledge that the establishment of LT-
SETs and education of transdisciplinarians would also benefit from
the work of those who study how science and society coevolve to
produce knowledge (59) and from those in science and technology
studies who study how knowledge emerges within the society and
culture it is situated in (60). In line with the science and technology
studies literature, we acknowledge that assuming a systems per-
spective on SETs is not free of normative implications for knowl-
edge production and governance. A deeper critical analysis of the
epistemological challenge concerning systems perspectives in
general and LT-SETs in particular is beyond the scope of the dis-
ciplines involved in this study, but we would welcome collaboration
on this in the future.
LT-SETs. To address sustainability challenges, Norström et al. (61)
call for coproduction of knowledge that 1) addresses the context
in which the research takes place; 2) recognizes different ways of
knowing, including indigenous and local knowledge; 3) is based
on clearly articulated shared goals; and 4) allows for ongoing in-
teraction among researchers and those living in and making de-
cisions affecting the relevant setting. This list describes what has
come to be known as “transdisciplinary” research (9, 29, 46, 62,
63), and is essential to the type of learning necessary for gover-
nance of SETs in a time of accelerating change. The complex
commons (Fig. 1) requires transdisciplinary research in which sci-
entists work with civil society, economic actors, NGOs, and poli-
cymakers to build capacity for contextualized understanding of
emergent system response to both policy and action.
A framework of single-, double-, and triple-loop learning within
governance regimes (Fig. 2) is useful for understanding the partic-
ipatory feedback needed to integrate understanding of coevolving
governance and SETs (49). Single-loop learning requires copro-
duction of system understanding and management design fol-
lowed by monitoring and incremental adjustment. This resembles
adaptive management (4). But research into learning for gover-
nance should go beyondmanagement. The necessary double- and
triple-loop learning require knowledge of the policy and social
sciences to ask not only what is technically feasible, but what is
humanly acceptable and does that alter our underlying assump-
tions? Questions of social, political, and legal feasibility of different
management options must be part and parcel of the learning
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process. Coproduction of knowledge may help shift the dialogue
and reveal more options than currently thought available. Under-
standing the availability of multiple options is essential because the
desire for stability provides a false sense of security in the face of
accelerating change and favors the status quo. Coproduction of
knowledge may be one way to break that path dependency.
Disciplinary sciences that reduce the biophysical environment
into component parts remain critical in generating knowledge, yet
they struggle with the emergent properties, chaotic dynamics, and
uncertain outcomes of complex systems (64). Empirical observa-
tions as well as high-speed computing and big data are helping to
generate actionable complexity science, yet they struggle with
SETs integration and the addition of governance due in part to the
roles of agency and power. Long-term integrated study that uses
incremental learning over time within a specific participatory context
can help generate knowledge on how to manage this complexity.
This requires deep understanding of individual SETs and governance
through time with the long-term engagement of society.
Nevertheless, this proposal for LT-SETs must address the fact
that place-based transdisciplinary research runs the risk of being
dismissed as mere case studies lacking the generalizable knowl-
edge so essential to the funding and publication goals of academic
researchers. Consider, however, that the focus on geographic
transferability (e.g., studying salmon in the Pacific Northwest of
the United States and Canada may generate knowledge useful for
the study and management of salmon in Finland) is too limited for
the Anthropocene. What about transferability through time? In a
complex system undergoing change, adaptive research to inform
adaptive governance must build on its own mistakes and suc-
cesses as a specified system evolves, deepening understanding of
the system and how its governance handles change. Aspects of
the process of adaptive governance may be transferrable geo-
graphically as the transdisciplinarians described below enter the
workforce, while the substance of the LT-SETs research will be
valuable through time.
Questions aimed at understanding coevolution of SETs and
governance are as much questions of science as they are of policy,
and they will not be answered if the two domains do not achieve a
greater level of integration both at the individual level and at the
level of knowledge-producing communities (scientific, but also local
and traditional communities). Thus, increased focus on incremental
understanding of SETs through time and on building long-term re-
lationships among the scientists and other knowledge producers,
affected civil society, management institutions, and policymakers
also requires a new approach to education. Such an approach places
significant emphasis not only on integrating different kinds of
knowledge and ways of knowing but also on strategies and methods
for managing diverging visions of the future in a complex SETs. Here,
it is crucial that the transdisciplinarian knows the legal boundaries and
opportunities for navigating adaptive governance through com-
plexity in a way that is legitimate, equitable, and just.
Applied Transdisciplinarians. Calls for funding for interdisci-
plinary scientific research for the grand challenges facing a society
remain critical today (65), but we also need a new type of scientific
practice—scientists trained to do transdisciplinary work at the
science–policy interface. While some agency, NGO, and industry
scientists as well as some academic researchers already practice at
this interface and many now take courses on science communi-
cation and science for policy, all of which are important, we cur-
rently lack training for people who have the skills to develop deep
understanding of the coevolution of governance and SETs. This
understanding requires training graduate transdisciplinary stu-
dents in a governance process and can be accomplished by ed-
ucating them within an LT-SETs.
Consider, for example, forging a field of public ecology in
which the scientists and scientific teams trained in transdisciplin-
ary systems must understand as much about the social, legal, and
policymaking systems as the ecological systems. They must not
only understand the differences in natural and built systems and
their context-specific interaction, but that place-based differences
in culture, norms, and history lead to differences in institutions, the
perception of science, and the capacity to act (8, 29). This concept
goes beyond the field of conservation biology in which the re-
searcher chooses to do research that furthers the conservation of
species and the ecosystems they rely on. It does so by developing
a methodological field of science in which the goals of research
and the research questions are coproduced with those dependent
on and managing SETs, and in which the research questions are
about the interplay and feedbacks among governance, infra-
structure, and a specific ecosystem. This type of research requires
comfort with experiments designed to be incrementally adjusted
based on feedback from monitoring of the natural, built, and
social systems.
Training such scientists will require the following: new pro-
grams that bring together educators, practitioners, and managers
from the natural, policy, and social sciences, engineering, and law;
incentives—including tenure criteria and peer review—that ac-
knowledge the value of integration and participatory research;
Fig. 2. Triple-loop learning in the context of governance. The concept of triple-loop learning is adapted from Pahl-Wostl (49).
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and funding and publication venues interested in the long-term
understanding of coevolving systems.
By increasing our understanding of the systemic behavior of
coevolving governance and SETs, cocreating that research with
those making decisions over time, and training a new type of
scientist at the evolving intersection of science and governance,
the knowledge of process and the messy science–policy interface
produced in an LT-SETs becomes transferrable to other settings.
In this way, the stage will be set to accelerate innovative gover-
nance responses to change in the Anthropocene while preserving
the values of legitimacy, equity, and justice.
Data Availability. There are no data underlying this work.
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